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The Lawyer as Charitable Fiduciary: Public
Trust or Private Gain?
Ronald Chester*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers often find themselves serving as trustees of trusts or as
directors of corporations because of their presumed expertise. In serving
as a director or trustee, the lawyer owes fiduciary obligations to the entities
involved.' A recent article in the ABA Journal2 directly warns attorneys
who serve as corporate directors of the heightened risks of successful
malpractice claims against them, particularly if they or their firms are also
legal counsel to the corporation. For example, an attorney who serves as
a director for an organization loses the defense that, in a particular case,
the corporation simply made a bad "business" decision and failed to follow
the legal advice the attorney had given it.4 This is because the lawyer "is"
the corporation when serving as director and is directly responsible for the
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law, Boston. A.B. Harvard, J.D. and Masters of
International Affairs, Columbia; Dip. Crim. Cambridge. The author would like to thank Victoria Dalmas, New
England School of Law, J.D., for her outstanding work on this Article.
I. James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct For Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PAcE L. REV.
389, 393-403, 423-32 (1987); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 824-29 (1983).
2. Robert E. O'Malley & Harry H. Schneider, Danger: Lawyer on Board, 79 A.B.A. J., July 1993, at
102 (noting that "the lawyer who serves as a director is much more likely to be sued for legal malpractice than
the lawyer who is not a director"). This article also illustrates that there is an increased risk of disqualification
for the director-lawyer from later representation of the client in litigation. See id. (noting that "the lawyer's
involvement as a participant in the corporate decisionmaking probably renders the firm disqualified from
representing the client in litigation, based on the lawyer-as-witness rule"). The lawyer-as-witness rule forbids
"[clombining the roles of advocate and witness [as this] can prejudice the opposing party and can involve a
conflict of interest between the lawyer and client" MODEL RUmE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.7 cmt.
(1992). "If a lawyer who is a member of a firm may not act as both advocate and witness by reason of conflict
of interest, Rule 1.10 disqualifies the firm also.' Id. The attorney-client privilege "is jeopardized when the lawyer
is involved in discussions in any other capacity other than as counsel.' Id.; see Note, Should Lawyers Serve as
Directors of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel?, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 711, 712 (1978) [hereinafter
Lawyers as Directors] (noting that "a lawyer-director cannot maintain his independent professional judgment
due to the conflicting interests, duties, and loyalties created by his merged role, and.., a lawyer-director cannot
be sure that the attorney-client privilege will attach to the confidences and secrets of his corporate client").
3. O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 2, at 102.
4. Id. "A potential conflict of interest.., arises from the fact that a lawyer-director may be held to a
higher standard of care simply because he has the legal training of an attorney." Lawyers as Directors, supra
note 2, at 715.
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corporation's decisions.' Since most lawyers' malpractice policies do not
cover their service as directors, attorneys are advised to be certain that the
corporation's "directors and officers" policy sufficiently covers them.6
Another area the ABA Journal warns about, and the one with which the
present Article is primarily concerned, is that of conflict of interest.7
Specifically, the ABA Journal cautions the lawyer/director to abstain from
voting on any proposal under which the attorney's firm stands to make
substantial gain.' The ABA article notes, however, that the lawyer/director
has significantly less to fear in terms of liability when serving on a
charitable, in contrast to a for-profit, corporate board.' The ABA Journal
attributes heightened liability in the for-profit context to the threat of
shareholder derivative suits." In the charitable corporation, the derivative
suit is nonexistent because there are no stockholders.
Section II of this Article discusses the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty required of an attorney who serves as a director or trustee of a
charitable organization." Section III sets forth the facts of a paradigm
case where two attorneys, acting as both lawyers and trustees to a
5. O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 2, at 102.
6. Id; see id. (noting that "[miany legal malpractice policies exclude coverage for legal malpractice
claims arising out of circumstances where a lawyer is acting as a director or officer"). Moreover, "[s]ervice on
the board of a federally regulated financial institution today is risky .... Most [director and officer] policies
specifically exclude coverage for claims brought by regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over financial
institutions." Id Finally, "[u]nder some [director and officer] policies, coverage exists only if the individual is
serving 'solely' as an officer-director." Id.
7. "Conflict of interest" is defined as a
[tierm used in connection with public officials and fiduciaries and their relationship to matters of
private interest or gain to them. Ethical problems connected therewith are covered by statutes in most
jurisdictions and by federal statutes on the federal level. The Code of Professional Responsibility and
Model Rules of Professional Conduct set forth standards for actual or potential conflicts of interest
between attorney and client.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 299 (6th ed. 1990).
8. O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 2, at 102.
9. Id.; see infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text (noting some of the reasons as to why attorney-
directors incur less liability in the nonprofit context). Nonprofit corporations, unlike for-profit corporations, are
subject to a non-distribution constraint that prevents the organization from distributing its net earnings to those
in control of the corporation. Note, Developments in the Law, Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578,
1581 (1992) [hereinafter Developments]. The distinction is important for liability purposes, as the nonprofit entity
does not have an interest holder completely analogous to the "common stock holder" in the for-profit context.
Id By contrast, the fiduciary duties of for-profit directors are enforced through shareholder derivative suits and
third-party actions. Id at 1604-05. Enforcement of fiduciary duties in the nonprofit area is generally administered
by understaffed and underfunded states attorneys general. Id at 1595-96.
10. See supra note 9 (describing the differences in enforcement of fiduciary duties of nonprofit and for-
profit corporations); infra notes 170-172 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys who handle shareholder
derivative suits have sources of information not available in the nonprofit context).
11. See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
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charitable organization, breached their fiduciary duties to the charity.' 2 An
analysis of the settlement between the attorneys in the paradigm case and
the Massachusetts Attorney General is provided in Section IV. 3 Finally,
Section V discusses the recommended enforcement mechanisms for
breaches of fiduciary duties by an attorney who serves as a lawyer and as
a trustee or director of a charitable organization.14
II. THE LAWYER AS DIRECTOR OR TRUSTEE OF A CHARITY
Charitable entities are organized either as trusts or corporations. The
corporate structure has become more prevalent than the trust form largely
because of the perceived and actual differences between the fiduciary
standards applied in each case.15 Traditionally, the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care were higher in trust law than in corporation law, as the
standards in the latter were largely developed in the for-profit context.
16
Under contemporary common law and charitable corporation standards, the
charitable corporation director owes higher degrees of care and loyalty
than does the for-profit counterpart.17 The nonprofit corporate standard,
however, is generally less stringent than the standard owed by the trustee
12. See infra notes 30.71 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 97-221 and accompanying text.
15. Developments, supra note 9, at 1593. Many courts apply the same for-profit director standards
towards nonprofit directors, since more stringent standards would deter volunteers from assuming the
responsibilities of a directorship. Id. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1987, includes a standard of care and standard of loyalty nearly identical to the standard
applicable in the for-profit sector. Id. at 1593-94; see REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.30
(1988) (providing the standards of care and loyalty). "Unlike the higher standard for trustees, the Model Act does
not strictly forbid transactions that implicate the interests of corporate directors if the transactions are fair to the
corporation or are approved in accordance with statutory provisions." Developments, supra note 9, at 1594; see
REVISED MODEL NONPROFrr CORPORAmTON AcT § 8.30 (1988) (indicating that transactions implicating the
interests of corporate directors are not strictly prohibited if the transactions are fair to the corporation or
approved in accordance with statute). See generally Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated
With the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. REv. 449, 451-57 (1978) [hereinafter
Fiduciary Duties] (noting that the fiduciary standards applied to trustees of charitable organizations are higher
than the standards applied to directors of charitable entities).
16. See generally Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15 (noting that the fiduciary duties required of a nonprofit
corporation director are more akin to the standards required of a for-profit corporation director because of the
historical similarities in organizational form). But see PHILIP BURING & RIcHARD C. ALLEN, MASS. B. ASS'N,
LiAntrrY IssuEs IN NONPROFIT ORGANIZAMONS 13 (Oct. 1988) (stating that "early cases tended to treat trustees
of charitable corporations as indistinguishable from trustees of trusts").
17. Burling & Allen, supra note 16, at 13-14 (noting that the fiduciary standards applied to directors and
trustees of nonprofit corporations will, at a minimum, be the standards applied to for-profit directors, but the
nonprofit standards will be applied with a heightened scrutiny).
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of a charitable trust."8 For the lawyer serving as charitable corporation
director or charitable trustee, there is also the matter that whatever may be
the general fiduciary standard for such offices, the lawyer may be held to
a higher one due to the lawyer's presumed professional expertise.19
Traditionally, a lawyer could also name himself trustee of a testa-
mentary trust (and thus the director of a charitable corporation) as long as
the client generates the idea and is fully informed of the risks inherent in
this type of transaction.20 Specifically, the client must be forewarned of
possible and actual conflicts of interest.21 Although not explicitly pro-
hibited by disciplinary or other rules, the attorney's conduct in being
named a fiduciary does represent a potential conflict of interest violating
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty to the charitable entity.22 If the attorney
is the sole trustee and subsequently is hired as the attorney for the charity,
then self-dealing becomes an issue. When the trustee is self-dealing, "no
further inquiry" is made as to the reasonableness of the transaction or the
18. See generally Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15 (discussing the different standards that are required
of a trustee and a director in a charitable organization).
19. See Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Trust Instruments and the Standard of Fiduciary Performance:
Focus on the Problems for Attorneys, 5 CONN. PROB. LJ. 59, 60, 67-68 (1989) (asserting that fiduciaries who
hold themselves out as having special skills or who possess special skills may be required to exercise a "higher
standard of performance" than a typical fiduciary). Courts hold trustees that claim to have special expertise and
ability to a higher standard of care in administering a trust, in exercising the requisite duty of care towards trust
fund investments, and in delegating ministerial responsibilities. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 452 n.18;
Lawyers As Directors, supra note 2, at 715 (noting that "a lawyer-director may be held to a higher standard of
care simply because he has the legal training of an attorney").
20. Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman as Testamentary
Fiduciary, 36 KAN. L. REv. 275, 282 (1988).
21. See id. at 279 (indicating that the "customary practice" of an attorney-draftsman naming himself a
testamentary fiduciary raises difficult ethical issues that have not resolved by the legal profession's ethical
codes). Theoretically, client initiation prevents solicitation, overreaching or undue influence on the attorney's
part. Id. at 282. This "ignores [the] fact that it is virtually impossible to determine if the idea in fact originates
with the client, since [the client] will usually be dead when a question arises." Id The fiduciary's powers are
derived from the trust instrument. 18 N.Y. JUL. 2d Charities § 42 (1992). If that trust instrument names the
lawyer as trustee at the client's request, but not as attorney for the trust as well, the presumption that an
independent counsel is required should be applied. deFuria, supra, note 20, at 276. Also, in cases where the
attorney drafting the trust instrument names himself or herself the trustee at the client's request, but not the
attorney for the trust as well, this presumption should be applied. See State v. Gulbankian, 196 N.W.2d 733, 737
(Wis. 1972) (suggesting presumption of ethical impropriety and undue influence when a drafting attorney is
named as fiduciary). There might be an argument under Model Rule 1.9 for a successive conflict of interest if
the attorney-draftsmen/trustee later appoints himself or herself as the attorney for the trust. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.9 (1992). This assumes that the lawyer's fees result in a pecuniary interest that
is sufficiently adverse to the client's interests.
22. See JESSE DUKEMImER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WuILs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 851-52 (4h ed.
1990) (stating that in order to fulfill the duty of loyalty, the fiduciary must administer the trust solely in the
interests of the beneficiaries). A conflict of interest should not violate the duty of loyalty when the fiduciary
demonstrates that the fiduciary "acted in good faith and that his actions were fair to the beneficiaries." Id. at 851.
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good faith of the trustee, as would happen in the simple "conflict"
situation.'
To expand the hypothetical, suppose the lawyer/trustee hires the
lawyer's firm as the attorney for the charity. In all likelihood this makes
no difference; the attorney is still self-dealing.24 If there are two trustees,
each of whom does legal work for the trust either alone or through his or
her firm, each is self-dealing.' In a charitable trust, unanimity of action
by trustees is not required.26 Thus, if only one of the trustees or that
trustee's firm does work for the charity, only that trustee would be liable
for self-dealing.27 The other trustee, however, if aware of this self-
dealing, would likely violate the duty of care if no action is taken.28
Thus, if the charitable trust had three trustees and two were lawyers
self-dealing with themselves or their firms, the two could "self-hire" by
majority vote. The remaining trustee, however, might have a duty to
pursue the matter with the probate court, provided the trustee can be
charged with the knowledge that the self-dealing of the co-trustees is
damaging the trust.29
23. Id. at 852. Self-dealing occurs whenever the fiduciary bargains with himself or herself in his
individual capacity. Id. at 851.
In case of self-dealing, no further inquiry is made; the trustee's good faith and the reasonableness
of the transaction are irrelevant. The beneficiaries can hold the trustee accountable for any profit
made on the transaction, or, if the trustee has bought trust property, can compel the trustee to restore
the property to the trust, or, if the trustee has sold his own property to the trust, can compel the
trustee to repay the purchase price and take back the property. The only defense the trustee has to
self-dealing is that the beneficiaries consented after full disclosure; even then the transaction must
be fair and reasonable.
Id. at 852. Charitable trustees do not have a strong incentive to maximize value when administering a trust
because they do not have a property interest in a nonprofit's assets or income. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 484 (3d ed. 1986). Thus, the trustee who additionally serves as counsel for a trust has a
greater pecuniary interest than the trustee who only serves as trustee. Id A question then arises whether this
added interest has any bearing on the trustee/attorney's obligations as trustee to maximize value for the trust.
Theoretically, even a well paid trustee/attorney would maintain his or her position so long as the trust estate was
efficiently administered. Id
24. O'Malley & Schneider, supra note 2, at 102.
25. Id
26. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra hote 22, at 866.
27. Id
28. Id. at 865-66. A fiduciary's duties of care include the duty to collect and protect trust property, the
duty to earmark trust property, the duty not to mingle trust funds with the trustee's own, and the duty not to
delegate discretionary functions. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 871-74. The fiduciary must act
as a prudent person in dealing with, and preserving, trust property. Id In failing to prevent the self-dealing of
a co-trustee, a trustee jeopardizes the trust property. Id.
29. See generally Burling & Allen, supra note 16, at 33-34 (discussing the trustee's duty of disclosure
when faced with any conflict of interest or potential conflict of interest).
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III. A PARADIGM CASE: THE CAROLINE WELD FULLER TRUST
For the purposes of this Article, a paradigm of a recent Massachusetts
case, Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc.,30 in which the two sole
trustees of a charitable trust dealt with themselves or their firms as lawyers
to the trust will be used. The facts of this case are as follows: Beginning
in 1984, charitable trustees A and B informed the Attorney General that
they were experiencing problems in attracting residents for the trust's
Fuller Retirement Home in Milton, Massachusetts. 31 The trustees believed
that the settlor's charitable purposes would remain unfulfilled unless there
was a change in the retirement facility and the services provided to the
residents.32 The trustees proposed to modernize and expand the residential
services provided by the trust.
33
In 1987, the trustees sought the Attorney General's assent to a cy pres
petition for court approval to change the purposes of the Fuller Trust.34
The trustees proposed to change the purposes of the trust to allow them to
build a continuing care retirement community consisting of individual
units, a nursing home and a main building which would be used by
individuals needing "assisted living.' 35
The Office of the Attorney General assented to a modified proposal36
and the Supreme Judicial Court approved the cy pres proposal on February
8, 1988. 37 The judgment gave the trustees the following authority:
1) to create and operate a congregate housing facility (life care
community) to include up to 200 units; 2) to devote such of the
assets of the Trust under the will of the Fuller Trust including the
accumulated income and the principal of the Trust, as the Trustees
in their discretion deem appropriate to accomplish the changed
30. No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
31. Affidavit of Johanna Sons, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, at 11, Fuller Trust (No.
SJC-06386) [hereinafter Sods Affidavit] (on file with the Pacific Law Journal); Brief of the Attorney General
at 7, Fuller Trust (No. SJC-06386) [hereinafter AG Brief] (on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
32. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 11.
33. Id
34. fI "The rule of cy-pres is a rule for the construction of instruments in equity, by which the intention
of the party is carried out as near as may be, when it would be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 387 (6th ed. 1990).
35. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 11.
36. ld at 12. Following an investigation and several discussions and meetings, the trustees agreed to a
modification of the trustees' plan, proposed by the Attorney General, requiring the trustees to give preference
to individuals of limited means. ld at 11-12.
37. Id. at 12.
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purpose, subject to the requirement that the Trustees give
preference for residence to applicants of limited means; and the
Trustees take all reasonable steps to seek federal state and local
governmental funding to support admission of the largest number
of persons whose level of financial means is less [than] eighty
percent of the median income in the Boston area for the person's
household size. 8
An Attorney General's investigation began in March 1992, when the
Attorney General was approached by a Milton town official expressing
concern that the Fuller Village project had not been physically started.39
This investigation revealed the following facts: In 1988, when the life care
project was in its initial stages, the trustees acted upon the advice of their
consultant4 and decided not to hire a developer to carry out the building
of the life care community. In acting as developers themselves, the
trustees sought to save the trust the expense of a developer's fee.42 A and
B were successful in obtaining the necessary town and state permits and
meeting zoning requirements.43 When the time came to obtain financing
for the project, however, the trustees encountered severe difficulties.'
After the Bank of New England, which had a working relationship
with A and B, declined to finance the project because of the bank's own
financial problems, the trustees went to the tax-exempt bond market.
45
They worked closely with Herbert J. Sims and Company (hereinafter
"Sims"), the largest underwriter in the country of continuing care
facilities.46 Negotiations with Sims subsequently failed when the trustees
38. 1L
39. Id. at 16.
40. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 8-9. The Fuller trustees' consultant was Robert Chellis, a recognized
expert in the life care area. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 13.
41. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 8-9.
42. Id. at 9.
43. IU. In order to obtain these permits the trustees hired architects, engineers, a construction company,
health care experts and others to satisfy the Milton Town Planning Board requirements and state public health
licensing requirements. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 13. The scope of the project was very large, calling
for between 160 and 200 units of individualized living quarters, assisted living quarters and a nursing home. Id.
at 13-14. The trustees envisioned an upscale continuing care retirement community. Id. at 1A. The trustees used
the most qualified architects and engineers and consultants available. Id.
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were unable to meet the underwriter's financing conditions.4 7 The trustees
went to other bond underwriters, but their efforts proved unsuccessful.48
The magnitude of the financial difficulties was apparent by October-
November 1991.49 By that time, the recession had taken a serious toll on
the real estate market and the continuing care market. 50 The trustees
simply were not able to finance the project on their own.5'
Subsequently, the trustees started to negotiate with real estate
developers who would be able to finance the life care project on a turnkey
basis.52 The developer who showed the most promise demanded that the
trustees mortgage thirty acres of land owned by Fuller Trust, Inc., in order
to finance the project.53 Trustee B determined that the deal, as structured,
would have unnecessarily tied up the land and have required an outflow
of cash from the project. 54 Both trustees feared that the project would be
partly built and then come to a halt because of lack of financing, resulting
in the loss of the trust's primary asset, namely, the land.55 Thus, the
trustees refused to continue negotiations based upon these terms.
56
In the investigation of Fuller Village, the Attorney General determined
that the trustees' actions did not cause the project to stall.57 During the
1980's, it was not uncommon for owners of land, including trustees, to opt
to act as their own developers.58 It appeared that the trustees' decision to
47. Id. at 14-15. Sims required that 70% of the units be presold before it would finance the project. Id.
at 14. In meeting the Sims condition, the trustees decided that Phase One would consist of 109 units, instead
of 160 units, with 9 assisted living units, and the construction of the nursing home was postponed. Id. The
trustees had also determined that a decline in the market necessitated the completion of the project in phases and
that pre-selling fewer units would enhance the timely completion of the project. Id. Subsequently, another
setback occurred when the bond market on life care communities declined and Sims increased the amount of
pre-sales necessary to go forward. Id. Sims also wanted the project to involve a "high visibility" equity partner
or $10 million dollars in reserves. Id. After the Sims deal fell through, the trustees entered negotiations with
Boston University, which did not come to fruition. Id. at 14-15.




52. Id. 'Tur-key contract" is defined as a project where a private contractor completes the work to the
point of readiness for occupation, at which time it is then sold to the customer at a pre-arranged price. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1516 (6th ed. 1990).
53. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 11. The trustees said that the developer's commitment in "up-front"
dollars and financing was insufficient to complete the project, which according to B, should have included the
developer's financing the first eighteen months of operation of the life care community. Softs Affidavit, supra
note 31, at 15.
54. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 15.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 12.
58. Id.
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proceed independently was based upon a desire to save the trust from
expending developer's fees.59 Additionally, there were two primary,
intervening circumstances that the trustees might not have foreseen as they
moved along in the development of the project: first, the recession; and
second, the almost universal decision in the world of financing to stop
lending to developers of continuing care facilities.6 These two events
converged in 1991 after the trustees had spent $3,671,359, including their
legal fees, on pre-development costs out of some $4 million in the trust.
6'
Since the Attorney General decided that A and B had acted reasonably,
although unsuccessfully, in putting the project together, the main focus of
the inquiry became the payment of legal fees to the trustees for legal work
performed by their respective law firms.62 A percentage of the work
performed by the trustees, and billed at their hourly legal rate, did not
qualify as legal work.63 That work which did qualify had to be billed at
reasonable rates.6 Approximately half of the amounts billed were justi-
fiable and reasonable as legal work.65 The Attorney General determined
59. Id It is customary for a developer to charge as a fee a percentage of the cost of the total project.
Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 17-18. A developer's fee can range from five to ten percent based upon the
complexity of a project. I&d The projected cost of the life care project was approximately $35 million. Ma at 18.
Therefore, a developer could have charged the trustees as much as $3.5 million dollars in fees by the time the
project was completed. I&a
60. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 12. When the trustees began the project, they believed that the trust
monies advanced to Fuller Village, Inc. and used to pay for the pre-development costs of the project would be
re-paid to the Fuller Trust from profits generated by Fuller Village, Inc. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 16.
The auditor, Ernst & Young, allowed $2.9 million dollars advanced by Fuller Trust to Fuller Village, Inc. to be
carried on Fuller Trust books as a receivable. I& The trustees had envisioned a situation in which the Fuller
Village would be profitable. Id. The profits from the project would be turned over to the Fuller Trust
endowment. i In satisfying the cy pres judgment, the income would be used to subsidize low income
individuals at the Village. Id.
61. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 12-13.
62. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 17-18.
63. I. at 19. According to this analysis, the trustees were billing for work which belonged in the category
of non-legal trustee tasks performed in the pursuit of the development of the project, and for which the trustees
were paid $20,000 per year in trustee fees from the trust. Id. Assisting the Attorney General in its analysis of
the legal fees issue was the litigation department of a CPA firm. Id. The accountant stated that the practice
discussed in the text above is called "blending" and occurs when legal and non-legal tasks are mixed and the
resulting fee reflects only the higher valued legal work. Id. The Attorney General also turned to development
lawyers for assistance. Id. at 20. The Attorney General was advised that the lawyering involved in a development
project of this scale included a number of things: (a) evaluation of existing land use and title; (b) negotiating
and drawing up the contracts for engineers, architects, construction company, marketing consultants and
employees, and all other consultants/employees (c) drawing up the condominium documents and (d) negotiating
the determination of need process. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 13-14.
64. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 19.
65. I. at 20. This would translate to mean that approximately $345,000 in billing was reasonable. In
addition to the blending issue, the Attorney General concluded that the trustees had charged the trust too much
money for their legal services, especially in light of the trust's charitable purposes, and the trustees' obvious
conflict of interest. Id. at 19.
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that the restitution of five hundred thousand dollars to the trust was fair if
accompanied by the immediate resignations of the trustees.6 The
settlement with A was implemented by his resignation as trustee and
director of the Fuller entities and the payment of $250,000.00 to the Fuller
Trust.67 Subsequently, the Attorney General accepted B's offer to settle
on the same terms as A.68
This decision was reached in the belief that the charitable and public
interest would be better served by this resolution than by litigation. 69 In
addition to the legal considerations which the Attorney General considered
in reaching settlement with the trustees, there were the practical
considerations. 0 Unless the trustees could be removed quickly, and a
generous-amount of money infused into the Fuller Trust, the charity would
cease to exist.
7'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FULLER SETTLEMENT
This author would have analyzed the case in the following manner: The
lawyers, and by extension their law firms, put themselves not only in a
conflict position, but in one of self-dealing. Effectively, there was no one
involved who had a check on what these trustees did as lawyers
representing the trust. Even had there been someone involved, such as a
third trustee, this would not resolve the self-dealing situation because that
third trustee would still be outvoted. Although, if the two had recused
themselves from lawyer selection, perhaps the third trustee, if not for any
self-interest, could choose the other two. More clearly, however, self-
dealing could be avoided if there were a five person board, composed of
three members who were not self-interested and who voted to hire the two
66. AG Brief, supra note 31, at 14-15.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id. at 15-16.
69. 141 at 15. The likelihood that such settlements will occur is probably factored into the "risk analysis"
that a trustee would make before deciding to self-deal. The path of least resistance for attorneys general, and
certainly one of fewer costs, leads to "settlement." Fiduciaries who are also attorneys are probably more aware
of the likelihood that such a settlement will eventually be made than those fiduciaries who do not possess a law
degree.
70. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 22-23. In July 1992, the liquid assets of the Fuller entities before
outstanding liabilities totalled $224,333. Id. at 22. The operation of the Fuller House was costing $22,500 per
month. Id
71. Id at 22. The Attorney General believed that the charity could only survive if it were spared the
consequences of protracted litigation. Id. In addition, the uncertainty occasioned by litigation would threaten,
and might destroy, the continuation or revival of a development for the benefit of the elderly on the Fuller site.
Id at 23.
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other trustees' firms as the trust's lawyers. Though A and B would not
technically be self-dealing in such a situation, they would still have a
conflict of interest. In the simple conflict situation, however, they would
merely have to show their transactions and fees were both reasonable and
made in good faith.72
By contrast, where there is self-dealing,73 at least at common law, "no
further inquiry" is made. 4 The guilty trustees must return all profit to the
trust75 and can be removed from office.76 Trustees A and B could, of
course, argue that their fees were the same as, or lower than, those that
would have been charged by independent lawyers, and thus, there is no
"profit" to them or damage to the trust. While this might be true in a
simple conflict of interest situation, such as where the three trustees with
no self interest voted to hire the other two as lawyers, where there is self-
dealing, as in the actual case, fairness and good faith are not a defense.77
The only available defense is consent by the trust,78 which could not be
obtained in this case because the only trustees who could "consent" to the
self-dealing were the self-dealing lawyers themselves.
In the affidavit and brief paraphrased above, the Attorney General did
not differentiate between conflict of interest and self-dealing.79 Though
the situation seems to clearly involve self-dealing, the Attorney General's
inquiry into the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees seems to suggest that
the office was willing to make 'further inquiry' and that the Fuller case
was being treated as a mere conflict situation.
72. DutEmImER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 851-52.
73. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (indicating that self-dealing occurs when the fiduciaries
bargain with themselves in their individual capacity).
74. See supra note 23 (noting that there is "no further inquiry" into the trustee's good faith and the
reasonableness of the transaction).
75. DuKEmiNIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 851.
76. 1L at 929-30. The only defense available to the trustee who engages in self-dealing is that the
beneficiaries consented after full disclosure and the transaction was fair and reasonable. Id. at 852. This is
analogous to the exceptions for conflicts of interest in Model Rule 1.7(b) which states that:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own
interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in
a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT RuLE 1.7(b) (1992) (emphasis added).
77. DUKEMtNtER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 852.
78. Id. The beneficiaries can only consent after full disclosure and even then the transaction must still
be fair and reasonable. Id
79. See AG Brief, supra note 31; Soris Affidavit, supra note 31.
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This Article submits that even in a simple conflict situation, such as
when members of a charity's board do legal work by majority vote of
disinterested board members, recusal by the interested members should not
resolve the conflict. Charitable trust or corporation decisions are not
disciplined by the marketplace nor by the corresponding threat of
shareholder derivative suits to enforce that discipline. The reasonableness
of the legal fees involved might best be determined by a system of
competitive bidding.80 If such a system were also required in buying legal
or other services for a charity, the self-interested trustee or director would
have to actually show that, due to familiarity with the organization, the
trustee was able to offer these services at the lowest cost to the charity.
Such a requirement would no doubt result in far fewer instances of a
charity's hiring its own board members or trustees to do legal work for
them. Already beset by the problems highlighted in the ABA Journal,8'
trustee or director/attorneys who are not able to get top dollar for their
services through "buddy arrangements" on a board will, unless truly
motivated by charitable impulses, probably defer to outside counsel.82
Another remedy for this situation would be to require charitable board
members or charitable trustees to petition the Probate Court, which
requires notice to the Attorney General, whenever one of them wants to do
legal work for the organization. In such a case, the entity would have to
show that it was not self-dealing with its own board members or trustees,
and, if only a conflict existed, that the fees being charged were reasonable
and made in good faith. Although at first blush this alternative might seem
to involve more time and paperwork than either the Probate Court or
Attorney General would want, the cautionary effect of these filings on
charitable fiduciaries will be worth any additional effort on the part of the
State.
The inquiry of the Attorney General in Fuller Trust83 was directed
first at which fees charged by the lawyers to the trust were actually for
80. Frederick C. Thayer, Regulation is Inevitable: Legal Planning or Illegal Collusion?, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 425, 426 n.2, 430-31 n.14-22 (1983) (describing the competitive bidding process).
81. See supra notes 2-10 and accompanying text (noting the heightened threat of liability where an
attorney serves as a director or trustee for a corporation).
82. "Buddy arrangements" may violate Model Rule 8.4 because it is professional misconduct for an
attorney to commit an offense involving dishonesty or to violate the rules through the acts of another or to
violate the Rules including charging unreasonable fees. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 8.4,
1.5 (1992). The Official Comment to Rule 8.4 states that, "[a] lawyer's abuse .... of positions of private trust
such as trustee .... officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization... suggest an inability
to fulfill the professional role of attorney." MODEL RULE OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.4 cmt. (1992).
83. Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc., No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
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legal work and which were for trustees' work, for which these individuals
were already being paid a flat trustees' fee.84 Added to this was the
Attorney General's concept of what were "reasonable" legal fees,
particularly in light of the trust's charitable nature. Of the roughly
$690,000 in legal fees charged the trust, the Attorney General determined
that approximately half ($345,000) represented "legal" work performed "at
a reasonable rate."'86 Still, each lawyer was forced to return $250,000 to
the trust, for a total of $500,000. On what theory or theories was the
additional $155,000 extracted?
The first way to look at this is that the entire $690,000 represented
"profit" to the self-dealing lawyers and that a $500,000 settlement was
reached simply to avoid the costs of litigation to the trust and to the
Attorney General in terms of time and money. Even if this were so, the
Attorney General's brief never states that all $690,000 would have been
returnable absent the settlement. There is, however, another matter that
may have led to the settlement at $500,000. Although the duty of loyalty
was violated by self-dealing, there is another duty here that the
lawyer/trustees may have breached: the duty of care. Under this duty,
trustees must, for one thing, preserve trust assets. 8 In the Fuller case, not
only was $690,000 siphoned off by the trustees to pay themselves as
lawyers, but approximately $2.3 million of work was delegated by the
trustees to other experts such as architects and consultants, without a
shovel ever being put in the ground. 9 Improper delegation violates the
duty of care." Investigation of the fees may well have disclosed improper
delegation of "discretionary," as opposed to "ministerial," matters to these
experts. For example, a number of fees were charged to the trust by
84. Sors Affidavit, supra note 31, at 18-20.
85. IdU at 19.
86. Id. at 20; Peter S. Canellos, 2d Trustee Quits; To Repay Milton Trust $250,000, BOSTON GLOBE,
August 21, 1992, at 21.
87. Id at 22.
88. See DUKMINIEmR & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 871-74 (stating that the fiduciary duty of care
requires the trustee to collect and protect trust property, to earmark trust property, not to mingle trust funds with
the trustee's own funds, and not to delegate to others the acts which the trustee can reasonably be required to
perform personally).
89. Telephone Interview with Johanna Sors, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts (Nov. 19,
1993) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Sors] (notes on file with the author).
90. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 874 (stating that, in general, the trustee's duty of
care requires the trustee to personally implement the provisions in the trust instrument). The trustee can,
however, delegate certain functions that are "ministerial" and not "discretionary:' Id. Some examples of
ministerial functions include the hiring of an attorney, accountant or real estate agent. Id.
1365
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
"consultants." 9' Almost by definition, a consultant tends to give "advice"
about choices that need to be made, rather than doing ministerial tasks that
must be done. Upon examination, a lot of that advice might have been
found to be within the realm of that which the trustees themselves should
have investigated in exchange for their flat fee as trustees.
As far as appears from the record, the Attorney General found the
entire delegation proper, despite the fact that it virtually destroyed the
working capital of the trust.92 The Attorney General appears to be saying
that A and B also acted prudently as to other matters which fell under their
duty of care despite the disastrous and expensive results. 93 This author is
not as sanguine about these "mistakes" as the Attorney General seems to
be. The trustees should have returned to the trust all $690,000 of hourly
fees (whether or not for strictly legal work) because of their self-dealing,
but they should also have returned an additional amount (to be determined
from thorough investigation) from the other $2.3 million in professional
fees for work they delegated out as trustees. This author is simply hard-
pressed to believe that these trustees have acted as prudent persons in
preserving the trust property.94
On the matter of fees, had A and B been in a simple conflict position,
then this author thinks that the issues addressed by the Attorney General
91. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 13.
92. The Attorney General's settlement did not include an inquiry as to whether the trustees violated their
duty of care in delegating functions to third parties. See id. 20-25.
93. Id.
94. The real problem here may be that by acceding to the trustees' earlier cy pres petition for extensive
expansion of the facility, the Attorney General had already assented to a great expense to the trust, whether for
a $3.5 million developer to complete the project or $3 million paid for professional services without any
building. Id. at 11-12. While the Attorney General required the trustees to return $500,000 to the trust for
overbilling, the Attorney General substantially excused, because of the unforeseen circumstances mentioned
earlier, the other $2.5 million in professional fees which was charged to the trust and may have been wasted.
Id. at 22.
On October 9, 1992, the Massachusetts Probate Court reserved and reported six questions regarding the
Fuller Trust to the Massachusetts Appeals Court, and on May 6, 1993, reserved and reported one additional
question regarding the settlement agreed to by the Trustees and the Attorney General. AG Brief, supra note 31,
at addendum. The Trustees requested direct appellate review of these questions, and the Attorney General joined
in their request, thus bypassing review in the Appeals Court and going directly to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. Fuller Trust (No. SJC-06386). The Supreme Judicial Court accepted the case and it was
transferred from the Appeals Court on October 22, 1993. Id. In a phone conversation with Assistant Attorney
General Soris, Ms. Soris stated that she does not expect the Supreme Judicial Court to involve itself with the
substance of the settlement because of the limited nature of the instructions requested. Telephone Interview with
Softs, supra note 89. Ms. Soris does not, however, entirely exclude such a possibility. Id.
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in Fuller Trust should have been determinative. Were the fees charged
fair and in good faith? If they were, the Attorney General's rationale
would make sense: the strictly legal work charged at a rate reasonable in
light of the charitable nature of the client could be charged to the trust.
However, since this was self-dealing, the Attorney General should have
required the surcharge suggested in this Article.96
V. RECOMMENDED ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
A. Professional Discipline of Lawyer/Fiduciaries
In addition to Attorney General action, A and B might also be subject
to disciplinary charges as attorneys under Model Rules of Professional
Conduct97 1.5,9' 1.799 and 1.8"e and, if a proper plaintiff could be
95. The trustees in recent Massachusetts Attorney General investigations at Boston University and
Newbury College who charged their charitable entities fees for service were in a simple conflict position.
Anthony Flint, Lucrative Tie Among College's Hierarchy, BOSTON GLOBE, March 25, 1993, at 25, 31; see also
Anthony Flint, AG to Scrutinize Newbury's Records, BOSTON GLOBE, March 27, 1993, at 14 (noting that the
Massachusetts Attorney General will conduct an investigation into the business deals made by, and arguably for,
the benefit of the Newbury College trustees).
96. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
97. More than 35 states and the District of Columbia have adopted all or significant portions of the
Model Rules. STEPHEN Gi.rmts & Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS at x (1993).
98. Model Rule 1.5 sets forth an affirmative duty on the attorney's part to charge reasonable fees. MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCI Rule 1.5 (1992). Model Rule 1.5 outlines several factors to determine the
reasonableness of fees including: (1) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (2)
the amount involved and the results obtained; and (3) whether the fee is a fixed one or not. Id. The Model Code
of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106(B) uses similar factors to determine whether a fee is clearly excessive.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSmLrrY DR 2-106(B) (1981). In any event, attorneys are advised under
Rule 6.1 to do work for charities on a pro bono basis, or at least for a substantially reduced fee. MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1992).
99. Model Rule 1.7(b) prohibits an attorney from representing a client when the attorney's own interests
may "materially" limit the representation of that client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b)
(1992). The Rule provides an exception where "the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected and ... the client consents after consultation." Id. The Official Comment to Rule 1.7 states
that "[I]oyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. (1992). The Comment further states:
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors
should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called
on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be
given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict,
the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining
legal advise from another lawyer in such situations. If there is a material risk that the dual role will
compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a
director.
Xd. By analogy, trustees or directors, who are also attorneys, should not hire themselves as attorneys for a
charitable trust or charitable corporation if the concerns outlined in the Comment to Rule 1.7 are present. ld
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found, might be subject to a malpractice claim. If it is argued that the
lawyer's interest in fees led to self-hiring in Fuller Trust"0 and that this
caused the trustees to try to "do it themselves" (the development) rather
than hire out to a developer (or scale back the project if it was too
expensive), they might be subject to discipline under Rule 1.7. 102
Further, there is also a competency issue present. If attorneys A and B
were not competent to do the work they charged for, they should have
delegated it to a developer. But here they arguably kept much of a
"developer's work" for themselves.'0 3 Although the Attorney General
apparently viewed their actions as reasonable, this Article questions this
conclusion.'0 4
Rule 1.8 indicates that lawyers might be subject to discipline for
"knowingly acquir[ing] a[] ... pecuniary interest adverse to a client" (the
trust). 5 The exceptions to this Rule do not appear to let these lawyers
off the hook because: (a) a disclosure is ineffective when made "to
oneself," (b) there was no reasonable opportunity here for the trust to get
independent counsel, and (c) the trustees cannot "consent" to their own
activities as lawyers 0 6
100. Model Rule 1.8 specifically prohibits the attorney from "knowingly acquir[ing] an ownership,
possessory,... or other pecuniary interest adverse to the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.8 (1992). The Rule outlines an exception where "the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires
the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client
in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;.., the client is given a reasonable opportunity
to seek the advice of independent counsel in the transaction; ... and the client consents in writing thereto." Id.
101. Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc., No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
102. See supra note 99 (noting that Model Rule 1.7 prohibits the attorney from representing a client when
the attorney's pecuniary interest in fees will adversely affect the representation of the client). When charilable
trustees hire themselves as attorneys for the trust, they arguably acquire a beneficial or pecuniary interest in the
trust, namely, the fees the trustees will be paid in their positions as attorneys. In the position of trustee, this
amounts to self-dealing, whereas in the position as attorney, this amounts to an impermissible conflict of interest
under Model Rule 1.8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8 (1992). The exceptions outlined
in Model Rule 1.8 are not applicable because client consent could not be obtained; supra note 100 (noting an
exception when the client consents after full disclosure). Two solutions might be to require the written consent
of the attorney general or to permit this type of conflict where the trust instrument sets forth a waiver.
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that the trustees acted as developers to save the
expense of a developer's fee).
104. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text (stating that the Massachusetts Attorney General
decided that the trustees had acted reasonably in developing the project themselves).
105. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (1992).
106. Id. at Rule 1.8(a)(l)-(3). Another solution to the conflict or self-dealing situation, would be to require
independent advice and written consent from the attorney general. Thereafter, continual oversight of the trustee's
actions could prevent what occurred in the Fuller Trust case. To expect meaningful oversight might be
unrealistic, however, since most attorneys general are already overburdened, understaffed, and low on resources.
James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J,
617, 669 (1985).
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Rule 1.5 may also be violated because the fees here were too high for
legal services to a charity in the Boston area or alternatively, because of
the "amount involved and the results obtained."10 7 As to the first issue,
the Attorney General implicitly found that even the amount charged by A
and B for strictly legal work was too expensive.' °8 As to the second, the
$690,000 was clearly and grossly out of proportion to the results, which
were noticeably absent in the Fuller case.
Given such possible violations, Attorney General referral of self-
dealing or unreasonable conflict situations to a Board of Bar Overseers or
comparable State lawyer licensing board might have a strong deterrent
effect. Certainly it is a mode of enforcement which should be considered.
B. Expanding Actions to "Beneficiaries" of the Charity
Disciplinary procedures aside, attorneys general in a situation like
Fuller Trust ordinarily see their responsibility, if any, as limited to an
action against the lawyers as fiduciaries to return ill-gotten monies to the
trust."° If these fiduciaries feel they have been misadvised, it would be
up to them to seek indemnification from the lawyers. Where the trustees
are the lawyers, as in Fuller, this indemnification would of course not be
sought. This would leave whatever class of "specially interested trust
beneficiaries" that could be formed to bring an action against the lawyers
as lawyers to the trust. If Attorney General action against the lawyers as
trustees is lacking or somehow deficient,110 the trust beneficiaries could
bring an action against the lawyers as fiduciaries. Even in the latter case,
however, such a course faces large obstacles.
In many states, by common law or statute, the Attorney General is
arguably the only party who can bring an action against the breaching
fiduciaries."' This action is equitable and, at best, can result in the
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.5 (1992).
108. Soris Affidavit, supra note 31, at 18-20.
109. Telephone Interview with Soris, supra note 89; see supra note 85 and accompanying text (stating that
the Attorney General applied a test of reasonableness to the legal fees).
110. Expanding the class of interested beneficiaries may not result in greater enforcement. See, e.g.,
Developments, supra note 9, at 1607. Without greater disclosure requirements, a plaintiff's attorney will not have
an incentive to sue because of high discovery costs. Moreover, beneficiaries may not have a sufficiently strong
economic incentive to pursue litigation. Thus, the "frivolous suit" argument against an expansion of the standing
requirements is invalid in the charitable context.
Ill. See Developments, supra note 9, at 1595 (noting that most state statutes and courts vest the power
to enforce the duties of trustees of charitable organizations in state attorneys general). See, e.g., CAL GOV. CODE
§ 12598(a) (West 1992); UNIFORM SUPERVISION OF TRUSTEES FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES ACr § 11 (1954).
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complete return to the charity of the money obtained in abuse of the trust.
The argument against granting "specially interested beneficiaries" standing
in these cases is particularly strong where the Attorney General has taken
some (though perhaps insufficient) action against the fiduciaries. Even if
this hurdle were overcome, such beneficiaries face the privity barrier in a
number of states. Privity may be found under the particular state's law on
private trusts."' If so, a real question remains whether charitable trust
112. Generally, an attorney's obligation is toward the attorney's client and not to a third party in the
absence of fraud or collusion. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 98-99 (Ill. 1982). The primary concern
in extending liability for negligence towards nonclients is the unlimited and unknown number of potential
plaintiffs, id. at 99, and the possibility of "vexatious litigation and suits by irresponsible parties who do not have
a tangible stake in the matter and have not conducted appropriate investigations." In the Matter of the Trust
Made by DeLong, 565 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (1991). Moreover, when the representation is adversarial in nature,
expanded liability can interfere with the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty towards her client. Pelham, 440
N.E.2d at 100. The trend in tort law, however, has been to abolish the privity of contract barrier towards the
nonclient who is specifically intended to be the beneficiary of the attorney's transaction. Brenda Boykin, Note,
The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. Rev.
999, 1013 n. 114 (1985). A nonclient can successfully assert that an attorney owed him a duty of reasonable care
to accomplish X when there are sufficient facts showing that the primary or direct purpose of the transaction
or relationship between the lawyer and the client (or the client's intent) was the accomplishment of X for the
nonclient, third party's benefit. Barbara L. Walker, Note, Attorney's Liability to Third Partliesfor Malpractice:
The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Privity, 21 WASHBURN U. 48, 59 (1981). California
courts balance the following factors in determining liability towards nonclients: (I) the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future
harm. Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958). As in the will drafting cases, nonclient
beneficiaries should be able to bring malpractice claims against negligent scriveners and/or attorney's of private
trusts. The concern for an unlimited and unknown number of plaintiffs should not deter courts in extending
liability in the private trust area any more than it has in the will drafting area, as the beneficiaries are
ascertained. In the charitable trust area, however, the beneficiaries are unascertained, which is one of the primary
reasons why state attorneys general are given enforcement powers over charitable trusts. Kenneth L. Karst, The
Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfiled State Responsibility 73 HARV. L. REv. 433, 436-37 (1960).
Nevertheless, the potential for an increase in lawsuits should not be a concern since attorneys general, if viewed
as representatives of unascertainable beneficiaries, are certainly "ascertainable" and limited in number. However,
attorneys general are likely to be highly selective in pursuing even basic fiduciary duty claims due to limited
resources. Id. at 452-60; see Fishman, supra note 106, at 668-69 (1985) (noting that state attorneys general have
extremely limited resources and a multiplicity of responsibility and, thus, selectively pursue suits against
charitable fiduciaries leaving charities largely self-regulated). Moreover, attorneys general do not have the power
to bring malpractice claims against a lawyer/fiduciary, or other tort claims.
The other concern of the courts in allowing specially interested beneficiary suits-the adversarial or
nonadversarial nature of the client's representation-would of course depend on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. The question would be whether the attorney/trustee as attorney had undertaken a duty towards
the client (the trust) that was adversarial in nature. In the Fuller Trust situation, was the attorney's duty of
loyalty towards the trust client (the primary purpose of the representation being the development of the elderly
facility) adversarial in nature? In other words, would the potential for future malpractice liability towards the
nonclient detract in some manner from the attorney's representation of the trust? Probably not, because this type
of transaction is precisely one in which the primary purpose of the attorney's representation is for third party
nonclients. In fact, the fiduciary's common law duty requires the fiduciary to administer the affairs of the trust
exclusively in the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
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beneficiaries are definite, ascertainable or "interested" enough to bring an
action that is permissible for their private trust counterpart." 3 This
Article shall examine the possibilities under present and developing law for
non-Attorney General actions against the fiduciaries of charitable organi-
zations.'14 Then the author will examine the possibility of suing chari-
table fiduciaries who are also attorneys in their role as lawyers to the
charity
15
1. Actions Against the Lawyer/Trustee of a Charitable Trust
The paradigm case, Fuller Trust,"6 involved a charity originally
organized as a trust.1 17 In such a case, fiduciary standards are not only
high, but are clearly established." 8 However, plaintiffs other than the
Attorney General would have to be potential or actual beneficiaries of a
charitable trust in order to bring an action against the lawyer-trustee.' 9
The lawyer's role is compatible with the fiduciary's role in regard to whose interests the transaction furthers.
See Bryant R. Gold, Note, Should Lawyers Serve as Directors of Corporations for Which They Act as Counsel,
1978 UTAH L. REv. 711, 713 (noting that the lawyer's judgment is to be exercised solely for the benefit of the
client). Moreover, there is no potential for the attorney's duty of loyalty towards the trust to be compromised
by a conflict of interest between the trust client and the intended nonclient trust beneficiary because the interests
of the client and beneficiary are compatible. Cf. Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 100-01 (asserting that "courts are more
willing.. . to extend an attorney's duty to nonclients in cases in which the attorney's representation of his client
has essentially been of a nonadversarial nature, such as drafting wills for the benefit of intended beneficiaries
thereunder").
113. See DUKDINM & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 618 (stating that "[tihe only person other than the
attorney general who can enforce a charitable trust is a person with a special interest as a beneficiary"). A
specially interested beneficiary is one who can demonstrate that "he or she is entitled to receive a benefit under
the trust that is not available to the public at large or to an average beneficiary." Id.; see, e.g., Gray v. Saint
Matthews Cathedral, 544 S.W.2d 488, 490-91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that a parishioner can sue to
enforce a trust for the benefit of his church); Gordon v. City of Baltimore, 267 A.2d 98, 101 (Md. App. 1970)
(holding that a taxpayer can sue to prevent the transfer of a library held in trust from the Peabody Institute in
Baltimore to the Pratt Library in that city); Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Ala. 1977) (granting standing
to students to sue college trustees). But see Miller v. Aderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172, 174-75 (Ga. 1971) (denying
standing to students to sue college trustees). Standing is typically denied where the plaintiff-beneficiaries claim
that their "special interest" is that they are the recipients of the charitable organization's services. Developments,
supra note 9, at 1597.
114. See infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 116-123 and accompanying text.
116. No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
117. See supra notes 30-71 and accompanying text (setting forth the facts of the Fuller Trust case).
118. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 451-52.
119. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting that only specially interested beneficiaries have
been granted standing to sue under a charitable trust).
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Such beneficiaries are, by definition, unascertained, at least to a
degree.' 20 Still, a lawyer's negligence in advising the trust to waste all
this "preparation" money, or a lawyer's misfeasance in charging excessive
fees which inhibited the fulfillment of the trust's charitable purpose, might
logically be actionable in some way by those who had advanced deposits
on rooms in the lifecare facility or even those who are presently staying
in the existing structure. The argument is that the lawyers owed a duty to
these people to advise the trust properly in the furtherance of their
interests. The lawyers breached this duty, causing tort liability.
Accordingly, it may make sense to a progressive court to let the "specially
interested beneficiaries" have standing in a civil suit against these two
attorneys for malpractice damages.
2. Actions Against the Lawyer/Director of a Charitable Corporation
Increasingly, however, charities are organized as charitable corporations
and not as charitable trusts.' Charitable corporations are entities whose
fiduciary standards were, at least initially, lower than the fiduciary
standards in charitable trust law.2 2 As the law has developed, the
fiduciary standards in nonprofit corporation law and charitable trust law
are now less clear.2 3 We must carefully examine those standards before
proceeding to an analysis of whether attorneys advising charitable
corporate fiduciaries can be held liable and to whom.
120. See Karst, supra note 112, at 436-37 (stating that in a typical charitable organization, "no one knows
who a beneficiary will be until the charity confers a benefit on him, and after such a benefit is conferred he has
no right to expect further benefits, and thus no remaining interest in the charity's funds"). By definition, a
charitable trust "is a trust whose 'beneficiaries' are from start to finish uncertain as to identity." GEORGE G.
BOGERT, TRUSTs AND TRUSTEES § 363 (2d ed. rev. 1991). In Pelham, the court discussed instances where the
privity barrier would not be applied, namely, where the attorney client relationship arose for the benefit of a third
party and where the third party "could have justifiably relied" on the attorney's duty to exercise reasonable care.
Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 101 (Il1. 1982). Certainly the beneficiaries in the Fuller Trust case "could
have justifiably relied." Id.
121. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 449-50; see Fishman, supra note 106, at 618 (noting that the
charitable corporation rather than the charitable trust has become the predominant organizational form for
charitable and benevolent activities in the United States).
122. Fishman, supra note 106, at 651.
123. Developments, supra note 9, at 1593.
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3. Fiduciary Standards for Directors of Charitable Corporations
Under state statutory and common law, directors of for-profit
corporations must satisfy the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.'24
Under the first duty, corporate fiduciaries must discharge their obligations
"with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would
exercise under similar circumstances.""2 In discharging the duty of
loyalty, such fiduciaries must act in "good faith" and in a manner they
reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation.
2 6
Some courts have indicated that nonprofit directors should be held to
the high standards typically imposed upon trustees. 27 One case stated
that "all property held by a benevolent corporation is impressed with the
charitable trust.' 2 It has been argued that fiduciary duties are especially
important in the nonprofit sector because the common stockholder, who
can bring a derivative suit against for-profit, corporate fiduciaries, has no
strict analogue in the nonprofit sector. 29 The fact that no profits are
distributed in a nonprofit context leaves no one financially interested in
being sure that corporate assets are used for proper corporate purposes.
Thus, strict standards of care and loyalty are needed to constrain
fiduciaries where the market, or bottom line, does not.
In Massachusetts, the Director of the Attorney General's Charities
Division has indicated that he believes the nonprofit director standard is
somewhere in between the strict trustee standard and the lenient for-profit
director standard. 30 A number of states, however, have been unwilling
to scrutinize the actions of nonprofit directors closely lest stringent
standards discourage volunteers from assuming directorships.' 3 1 In fact,
the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1987 includes standards
nearly identical to those used in the for-profit context.13 2 "Unlike the
higher standard for trustees, the Model Act does not strictly forbid
transactions that implicate the interests of corporate directors if the
124. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1985).
125. Id.
126. Id. at § 8.30(a)(1), (3).
127. Developments, supra note 9, at 1593.
128. Samarkand of Santa Barbara, Inc. v. County of Santa Barbara, 216 Cal. App. 2d 341, 355, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 151, 159 (1963).
129. Developments, supra note 9, at 1591.
130. Burling & Allen, supra note 16, at 13-14.
131. Developments, supra note 9, at 1593; see, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE §§ 5239,7231.5 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing additional protection to volunteer directors).
132. Developments, supra note 9, at 1593-94.
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transactions are fair to the corporation or are approved in accord with
statutory provisions."' 33
Many commentators, however, have not been pleased with the adoption
of for-profit fiduciary standards by nonprofit codes. 134 For example, they
have argued that such standards ignore in the charitable area, "the absence
of specific beneficiaries or shareholders to act as watchdogs of
directors."'135 Whatever hurdles exist due to lower fiduciary standards for
a charitable corporation's directors than would be true of a charitable
trustee, questions of standing are even more problematic for those who
would enforce fiduciary duties in either type of charitable entity.
4. Standing for Suits Against Charitable Fiduciaries
Common law states that "specially interested beneficiaries" of a
charitable trust may have standing to sue trustees for breach of fiduciary
duty. 136 Cases which have so held, however, are strictly limited both in
number and in their definitions of appropriate plaintiffs. 3 7 Moreover,
many jurisdictions effectively vitiate this general rule by giving the
Attorney General exclusive, or at least primary, power in this area.1
31
Thus, the private actions that are allowed may only lie where the Attorney
General has either failed or refused to act. Still, there is caselaw stating
that the Attorney General does not have exclusive power to enforce
charitable trusts in California. 139 In addition, influential commentators,
such as Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley Johanson, have argued for ex-
panding the possibility of private enforcement suits, at least where the
Attorney General does not act. 14
133. aiL at 1594.
134. See, e.g., Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 460 (noting that the for-profit fiduciary standard does
not account for the absence of specially interested beneficiaries and shareholders to police the nonprofit
organization).
135. Id.
136. DUuKmNIER & JOHANSON, supra note 22, at 618. Donors, however, are generally denied standing.
See Developments, supra note 9, at 1596-97 (noting that the restriction against donor standing may stem from
a concern that too many frivolous suits will be brought by many small donors).
137. Developments, supra note 9, at 1598.
138. Id at 1595-96 n.32. Massachusetts is one state where the Attorney General has exclusive power to
sue nonprofit fiduciaries for breaches of trust. Id. at 1596 n.31.
139. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 754, 394 P.2d 932, 935,
40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247 (1964).
140. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, TEACHERS' MANUAL
174-75 (1990).
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Some courts have held that "[tihe rule that parties especially interested
may sue to compel performance is as applicable to the law of charitable
corporations as to the law of charitable trusts."'41 Under the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, "members" '142 may have a statutorily
defined suit, as well as those with a "'special relationship' to the
corporation, including beneficiaries of the corporation's activities.' 43
Moreover, directors have not been specifically prohibited from bringing
such a suit.'" The New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law permits
"specific groups enumerated in the corporation's charter to bring actions
against breaching directors."'4
The case of Jones v. Grant 46 is often cited as an example of
expanded standing since it allowed students at a nonprofit college to bring
a class action against its board of directors for misuse of funds. 47
Moreover, in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training Center School
for Deaconesses and Missionaries,1 48 a case closer to the facts of the
Fuller Trust 49 case, a hospital's patients were allowed to sue the
hospital's trustees because they had a "special interest to challenge the
conduct of the trustees."'5 ° A broadened conception of standing would
permit any beneficiary of a charitable organization's services to sue that
organization's fiduciaries.' Some courts have criticized the Stern
court's broadened, conception of standing and have commented on its
limited use in charitable trust and nonprofit corporation law.' s2 In
Christiansen v. National Savings and Trust Company,153 the court dis-
missed a class action brought by beneficiaries who sought private damages
141. City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487, 495 (N.J. Super. 1967).
142. See REVISED MODEL NoNPRoFrT CORP. ACT § 6.30(a)(i) (1988) [hereinafter RMNCA] (noting that
"any member or members having five percent of more of the voting power or... fifty members" can bring an
action on behalf of the corporation).
143. Developments, supra note 9, at 1594-95.
144. John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 802-03 (Wis. App. 1989).
145. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720(b) (McKinney 1970).
146. 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977). But see Miller v. Alderhold, 184 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. 1971) (denying
standing to students who brought suit against the trustees of a private college that was organized as a charitable
corporation).
147. Jones, 344 So. 2d at 1211.
148. 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973), supplemented by 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
149. Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc., No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
150. Stern, 367 F. Supp. at 540.
151. Developments, supra note 9, at 1597-98.
152. Id at 1598.
153. 683 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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rather than equitable enforcement against a nonprofit corporation's
directors."' 4
One reason for the Christiansen court's disinclination to expand
standing in the charitable arena appears to be that "[riecipients of services,
the beneficiaries of corporate activities," did not have a sufficient interest
in the organization to call board members to account since they have no
right to the services. 155 If this privilege/right distinction is important to
courts, it is perhaps not an impediment on facts such as those in Fuller
Trust, where existing "home" occupants were paying for their accom-
modations, and many others had put down $1,000 deposits on units which
were planned to be built. 56 Thus, one way to expand standing in the
charitable area, while keeping it within traditional conceptual limits, would
be to allow those recipients of services who could show some contractual
or financial stake in the services to sue.
C. Obligations of Charitable Fiduciaries Under the Internal Revenue
Code
Other than state attorneys general and a limited group of specially
interested beneficiaries, only the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can
enforce charitable fiduciary duties, in this case largely the duty of
loyalty. 57 The typical charity is granted its immunity from federal
taxation under Internal Revenue Code section 501(C)(3), which provides
that "no part of the net earnings of [the charity] inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual.' ' 5 8 Courts have construed this lan-
guage to prohibit self-dealing by charitable fiduciaries. 5 9 "The inurement
prohibition of Internal Revenue Code section 501(C)(3) is generally
directed at payments that are made to shareholders or individuals for pur-
poses other than as reasonable compensation for goods or services."
'' 0
Internal Revenue Code section 503(b) also denies tax exemption to
154. Christiansen, 683 F.2d at 527-29.
155. Kristen M. Brown, The Not-For-Profit Corporation Director: Legal Liabilities and Protection, 28
FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 57, 61 (1977).
156. Peter S. Canellos, 2d Trustee Quits; To Repay Milton Trust $250,000, BOsTON GLOE, August 21,
1992, at 21.
157. Developments, supra note 9, at 1598.
158. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988).
159. Developments, supra note 9, at 1598.
160. See (1990] 6 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) para. 3033.0227 (CCH explanation).
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organizations that engage in specified "prohibited transactions," including
the payment of excessive compensation to fiduciaries.
161
Private foundations, a subclass of charity among which nearly all the
charitable trusts (as opposed to corporations) are found, are subject to even
more rigorous Internal Revenue Code treatment. 162 For example, private
foundations cannot receive tax-exempt status unless their charters prohibit
the foundation from engaging in any act of self-dealing.163 Internal
Revenue Code section 4941 imposes an absolute prohibition on almost
every conceivable transaction between a private foundation and a
"disqualified person" including "payment of compensation" involving that
person.' 64 Disqualified persons include, inter alia, foundation managers,
owners of more than 20% of the total combined voting power of the
corporation, or owners of more than 20% of the beneficial interest of a
trust or unincorporated enterprise.1 65 Whereas directors of non-private
foundations bear no personal risk of liability (the single IRS remedy being
removal of the charity's tax exemption), self-dealing fiduciaries in private
foundations can be assessed individual tax penalties (an excise of at least
5% of the amounts involved in the acts of self-dealing for each year).'6
This "excise tax" can in some cases reach 200% of the amount
involved.167
D. Inefficiencies of Current Sanctions Against Charitable Fiduciaries
A recent comment in the Harvard Law Review concludes that neither
attorney general action, nor nonprofit corporation statutes authorizing suits,
nor Internal Revenue enforcement "sufficiently deter" charitable fiduciaries
from violating their obligations.168 Low staffing is a key problem for
attorneys general and the IRS, as is the lack of effective remedies. 169 A
big deterrent to suits by private parties against charitable fiduciaries is the
lack of cheaply obtainable information regarding potential causes of action
161. I.R.C. § 503(b) (1988).
162. Private foundations receive their funds from, and are controlled by, an individual, a family, a
corporation or a group of a limited number of members. VIRGINIA A. HODGKINSON & MURRAY S. WEITZMAN,
DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTOR: A STATISTICAL PROFILE 216-217 (3d ed. 1989).
163. Developments, supra note 9, at 1599 nn.56-57.
164. Md. at 1599 n.57.
165. I.R.C. § 4946(a)(1) (1988).
166. Id.
167. I.R.C. § 4941(b)(1) (1988).
168. Developments, supra note 9, at 1600.
169. Ud.
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for what the article styles the "entrepreneurial attorney."' 70 Whereas
attorney driven stockholder derivative litigation can be effective in the for-
profit context, often because the attorney is able to "piggyback" onto
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigations, it is rarely
undertaken in the nonprofit sector.17 1 Added to this lack of information
(which is being remedied to some extent by IRS disclosure requirements
for charities)'72 are the major standing problems outlined above.'
73
Since increased effectiveness of sanctions on charitable fiduciaries can
be more cheaply purchased by strengthening the duties themselves than by
adding huge numbers of enforcement personnel, commentators have argued
that the trustee standard for the duty of loyalty (which should have been
in play in the Fuller Trust case)' 74 should be applied to all forms of
charity.' 75 Such a standard prohibits self-dealing and would have "an
enormously salutary effect."'
176
However, the Model Act rejects the trustee standard for the duty of
loyalty, because a strict duty "may cause a nonprofit corporate director to
forego opportunities that would benefit the corporation' 7  or decline to
serve altogether for fear of liability, especially in the case of
volunteers.
71
Likewise, the Act adopts the lenient for-profit duty of care, which is
permitted to be supplemented by the "business judgment" rule, which
imposes liability only in cases of "gross negligence or willful
misconduct.' 179 Some courts have argued that there should be a stricter
duty of care for nonprofit directors, such as the simple negligence standard
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. BRUCER. HoPKINS, THELAWOpTAXEXEMPTORGANIZATIONS782-88(6thed. 1992&Supp. 1994).
173. See supra notes 136-156 and accompanying text (noting the standing limitations in suits against
charitable fiduciaries).
174. Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc., No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
175. See generally Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 460 (asserting that the for-profit fiduciary standard
in the nonprofit context ignores the absence of specially interested beneficiaries and shareholders in charitable
organizations).
176. Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 570 (1981).
177. Developments, supra note 9, at 1603; RMNCA, supra note 142, at § 8.31 & cmt. 1.
178. Charles Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 456
(1991).
179. Developments, supra note 9, at 1601; RMNCA § 8.31 (1988).
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applied to trustees."' This stricter duty of care was rejected by the
Model Act 18 for the same reasons as was a stricter duty of loyalty.1
8 2
As mentioned above, the Stem case gives some hope for broadened
standing to bring a suit in the first place.18 3 However, a subsequent
federal case interpreted Stem as saying that the fiduciary duties of the
directors of a hospital are owed to the charity and not directly to the
patients as beneficiaries.! Thus, a recent Harvard Law Review article
concludes that these cases mean standing should not be given in such
situations to nonpaying patients or beneficiaries, but only to those whose
"'special relationship' to the organization was that of a patron or a paying
customer. This approach would increase the class of potential plaintiffs yet
limit the class to those who have shown a prior [financial] commitment in
support of [the charity's] activities. ' ' 85  The Harvard article also
concludes, however, that relaxation of standing requirements is "unlikely
to enhance enforcement of fiduciary duties" and "might result in frivolous
suits."' 86 The Harvard article focuses instead on the problem of damages
against the breaching fiduciary. 187 If the maximum remedy is for the
fiduciary simply to return her improperly obtained profits to the
charity,"' unscrupulous fiduciaries will continue to behave dishonestly
as long as the probability of getting caught is less than 100%.189 The
commentator suggests that judicially proclaimed punitive damages would
be ineffective as a deterrent because of their unpredictability.' 90 How-
ever, a statutorily enacted system of fines that reimburses charities in an
amount equal to three times the fiduciary's ill-gained profits might well
180. See, e.g., Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 298, 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 89 (1970)
(noting that directors must perform their duties in compliance with strict trust principles). See also Boston
Athletic Assoc. v. International Marathons, 467 N.E.2d 58, 64 (Mass. 1984) (suggesting that the corporate trustee
will be judged by the standards applied to directors of nonprofits, and that those standards will be applied with
a heightened scrutiny).
181. RMNCA, supra note 142, at § 8.30.
182. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text (noting that a heightened standard would prevent
volunteers from becoming directors and cause directors to be overly cautious in investing corporate funds).
183. See supra notes 148-150 and accompanying text (allowing hospital patients to sue the trustees because
the patient-beneficiaries had a special interest).
184. Christiansen v. National Say. & Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
185. Developments, supra note 9, at 1606.
186. Id. at 1607.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1607-08. Not even this was accomplished in the Fuller Trust case. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text (noting that the Fuller trustees were merely required to return their excessive fees).
189. Developments, supra note 9, at 1608.
190. Id. at 1610. "Because punitive damages are likely to be awarded without any reference to the level
of underenforcement, they are not likely to deter sophisticated but unethical directors." Id
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work.1 9' The analogy here is the treble damages that are available for
private enforcement of antitrust violations.
192
If the recommended statutory damages were paid completely or even
partially to such plaintiffs, instead of to the charitable corporations
themselves, this might encourage private actions via entrepreneurial
plaintiffs' attorneys, partially curing underenforcement. However, there is
the problem that such provisions might increase frivolous suits.'93 If the
actions were brought solely by the attorney general and all monies returned
to the charity, the higher statutory fines would have a deterrent effect. As
with IRS enforcement of its "excise tax" against breaching fiduciaries,
however, the problem of understaffing (and, thus, underenforcement of the
penalty) would remain. Thus, this author would prefer enlisting the
services of private attorneys in such actions by returning only the base
amount taken to the charity, with penal damages being divided between the
plaintiffs and their attorneys.
E. Potential Liability of Attorneys for Charitable Fiduciaries Who
Breach Their Duties of Loyalty and Care
It should be clear by this point in the argument that counsel to
charitable organizations who also choose to serve as trustees or directors
of those organizations bear relatively little actual, as opposed to potential,
risk of being caught for disloyalty or mismanagement and that, if they are
caught, the penalties they face are relatively slight (even in such an
obvious case as Fuller Trust). Of course, the members of the exclusive
"club" that control charitable organizations, a number of whom are
lawyers, will be the first to claim that this really does not matter all that
much because mere allegations of wrongdoing will be enough to deter
members of an elite group that are quite concerned with their individual
reputations for propriety. They are so concerned with appearing
"respectable" that they will try very hard to be respectable when carrying
out their fiduciary obligations to the charity. 94
191. Id. at 1611. One commentator noted that such a system of "mandatory treble damages might induce
juries to acquit defendants whose violations of the law do not seem 'severe."' Id. at 1611 n. 118. There is usually
no problem under such a statute with juries letting defendants off when the breach is relatively minor, because
derivative suits brought in state courts are tried by a judge in equity proceedings. Id.
192. Id at 1611.
193. Id
194. Cf. RONALD CHEsTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND Socim 103-04 (1982).
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This author is confident that many lawyer/fiduciaries do feel so
constrained regardless of their fear of being caught for wrongdoing. How-
ever, I am equally sure that lawyers are human and that they believe that
by virtue of their status they are entitled to a certain standard of living.
Because of their of training, lawyers as a group are probably more aware
of both the risks and financial opportunities involved in serving tax-exempt
organizations. If they see profitable self-dealing and "backscratching"
going on all around them, many lawyers will decide to join in, uncertain,
one supposes, of just how unrespectable such conduct is actually
considered to be.
Attorneys general or others might turn in such lawyers to bar oversight
boards for violation of disciplinary rules. So far, this practice has been
infrequently used to remedy the violations described herein. Of course, not
only a cynic would be forced to observe that the general, often permissive,
language of these rules is drafted by lawyers, and that the boards are
staffed by more of the same. 95
Malpractice litigation against attorneys representing trusts or
corporations may thus prove to be a more promising avenue of
enforcement. Perhaps in part because plaintiff's attorneys benefit from such
litigation (and there is an oversupply of lawyers seeking work), modem
decisions have favored expanding liability beyond the privity barrier and
attorney-client relationship. 96 There has been an "explosive development
in the field of legal malpractice [in] . .. the scope of liability of attorneys
to those individuals other than the immediate client."197 In general, this
is true where it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would rely on the
lawyer's counsel, or where the plaintiff was the intended beneficiary of the
lawyer's retention.'
98
Thus, in appropriate cases, "beneficiaries might be found to have rights
against counsel to trustees . . . who [have] allegedly made some error
which affects them." 199 Beneficiaries of a trust must rely on the trustee
and the trustee's attorney for proper carrying out of trust objectives, as
195. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Non-Association - Continuing
Seige, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 68-69 (1983).
196. RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 7.11 at 381-90 (3rd. ed. 1989);
Holly Metz, Blind Justice, STUDENT LAW., May 1993, at 26, 29.
197. DAVID J. MEISELMIAN, ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE 93 (1980).
198. Id. at 107; MALLEN & SmrrH, supra note 196, § 7.11 at 381-85 & § 7.12 at 390-92.
199. E. Lund & C. Smith, Problem Areas in Estate & Trust Administration, THE BEsT OF M.C.L.E., Aug.
1992, at 43, 50.
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they have no independent control or power.00 Under Craig, Rae and
their progeny "life or term beneficiaries of a trust, whose interest is
diminished... may have a claim on the theory that they are foreseeable
persons to whom the [fiduciaries'] attorney owes a duty of care." 2 1 In
fact, it is hard to imagine an attorney-client relationship more explicitly
dedicated solely to benefit third parties than that of a fiduciary and the
fiduciary's counsel.20 2
Let us take the Fuller Trust03 case as an example. It is arguable that
a duty of care was owed by A and B as attorneys to those who already
inhabited the old age home and to those who had put down deposits on
accommodations in the planned expanded facility. Though A and B would
be quick to argue that their duty of loyalty to the client (the trust) might
conflict with duties to these nonclients, here as in most charitable
organization cases, the duties sit comfortably beside each other. Besides
the duty not to self-deal at the expense -of the trust and of these bene-
ficiaries, A and B would owe both the trust and beneficiaries a duty of care
not to diminish trust assets.2°
There are two main tests for attorney liability to nonclients: the so-
called California balancing test for defining the scope of the lawyer's tort
liability and the third party beneficiary test.205 If one could get over the
standing problems for charitable (as opposed to private) trust beneficiaries
discussed above, °2 the present and future rest home inhabitants in Fuller
200. Plaintiffs' Opposition and Memorandum in Support Thereof to Ropes and Gray and Edwards and
Angell Attorneys' Motions to Dismiss at 10, Spinner v. Nutt, Suffolk County Superior Court (1992) (No. 92-
5194-B).
201. Lund & Smith, supra note 199, at 50.
202. Plaintiffs' Opposition and Memorandum in Support Thereof to Motions to Dismiss at 10, Spinner
(No. 92-5194-B).
203. Attorney General v. Fuller Trust, Inc., No. SJC-06386 (Mass. argued Jan. 6, 1994).
204. Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to a
Person Other Than Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, 474 (1988 & Supp. 1992); see MALLEN & SMITH,
supra note 196, § 7.10, at 379 (describing the trend of modern courts to expand the privity rule in actions for
negligence beyond the confines of the attorney-client relationship, to permit an action by a plaintiff who was
intended to be the beneficiary of the lawyer's retention); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer
Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs, 15, 41-42 (1987) (noting the unconventional
nature of a lawyer's responsibilities in a "triangular relationship," which may include duties owed to a non-client
who is in a transaction dominated by a client).
205. MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 196, § 7.11 at 382-86 & nn.8-16. The California test balances six
criteria: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability of harm
to the plaintiff, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, and (6) whether
recognition of liability under the circumstances would create an undue burden on the profession. Id. at 382.
206. See supra notes 136-156 and accompanying text (discussing the present standing obstacles applied
to beneficiaries of charitable organizations).
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Trust would seem to meet either test. As in Lucas v. Hamm,"7 the main
purpose of the transaction between the attorney and trustees was the main-
tenance of trust principal for the benefit of trust beneficiaries. Thus, under
the California test, the trustees could be held liable for negligence in
advising the near destruction of trust assets in violation of the duty of care.
They were also intended third party beneficiaries of the trust/attorney
relationship since the principle purpose of the attorney's retention was to
provide legal services for their benefit." 8 The fact that the attorneys in
Fuller Trust were also trustees implicates the duty of loyalty as well as the
duty of care. Had the attorneys in fact been independent, they might still
be held liable for negligence.
Counsel to a charitable trust might also be found liable on the theory
that they aided and abetted the breach of fiduciary duty of their clients.
According to section 876(b) of the Restatement 2nd of Torts, a person is
liable for harm resulting to a third party from the tortious conduct of
another, if that person "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other."209 Thus, the general rule is that a person who participates in the
breach of trust by a fiduciary is responsible for the damage resulting to the
trust if the person knew that the fiduciary was committing such a breach
of trust or if the person had knowledge of the facts such that the person
can reasonably be held to have acted in bad faith.210 Moreover, the
person is liable "to those for whose benefit.., the fund should have been
administered.,
211
At least in the field of private trusts, it is clearly established that, as
was said in the Massachusetts case of Kaltsas v. Kaltsas,212 "where the
[trustee] cannot be expected to bring an action [against the attorney] for
the return of assets to the [trust], 'by reason of his interest or otherwise,'
such an action may be brought by '... a person beneficially interested in
a trust fund ... to enforce a claim in favor of such fund.' ' 213 Moreover,
where the plaintiff's petition alleged breach of fiduciary duty on the part
207. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987
(1962).
208. Lucas, 56 Cal. 2d at 589-90, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
209. RESTATEMENT (SE oND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1979).
210. Andrews v. Tuttle-Smith & Co., 78 N.E. 99, 101 (Mass. 1906).
211. Andrews, 78 N.E. at 101.
212. 497 N.E.2d 26 (Mass. Ct. App. 1986).
213. Kaltsas v. Kaltsas, 497 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Mass. Ct. App. 1986) (quoting Walsh v. Mullen, 50 N.E.2d
1, 3 (Mass. 1943)).
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of the fiduciary, "... . [t]hat is sufficient to show that the [fiduciary] is
'unable' [to bring an action against the attorney] 'by reason of his
interest."
214
In Fuller Trust, since the trustees were also the attorneys for the trust,
they could hardly be expected, because of their "interest," to sue them-
selves for malpractice. In addition, the language of Kaltsas seems to
include the case where an independent attorney is being sued for assisting
the fiduciary in breaching the fiduciary's obligation.215 Thus, even if A
and B had hired outside counsel, the present and future nursing home
occupants might, by suing them for breach of fiduciary duty, establish that
if the fiduciaries were as imprudent as alleged, they would not sue their
own counsel under Kaltsas. This would allow the nursing home occupants
to sue the attorney in lieu of such a suit by the trustee. Of course, as
mentioned earlier, these occupants would have to establish that they had
standing because of a "beneficial interest in the trust," which is a difficult
leap in a charitable rather than a private trust case.
216
Admittedly, no case has been found where the lawyer for a charitable
trust has been successfully sued for malpractice by recipients of that trust's
services. Still, if the case can be made in the private trust area (as above)
for such third party liability, I see no reason not to extend the liability to
situations such as Fuller Trust, where the plaintiffs have a financial stake
in the services of the charitable trust, and the trustee cannot or will not
seek indemnification itself from the lawyer.
If liability were so extended, I see no conceptual difficulty in imposing
it where the attorney is advising the director of a charitable corporation
rather than the trustee of a charitable trust. Since the standards of fiduciary
care and loyalty, however, are generally lower in the charitable corporate
than in the charitable trust area, the lawyer would have correspondingly
lower duties to ensure the reliability of the advice that the attorney gave.
Since common law self-dealing, as opposed to conflict of interest,
would be relatively rare in the charitable corporate area (because of the
possibility of recusal from relevant votes), any payment by directors to
themselves or their firms would only have to be reasonable to satisfy the
duty of loyalty. State statutory definitions of self-dealing and conflict of
214. Walsh v. Mullen, 50 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1943) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 7 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (Mass.
1937)).
215. Kaltsas, 497 N.E.2d at 28.
216. See supra notes 136-156 and accompanying text (discussing standing limitations to suits by
beneficiaries against charitable organization fiduciaries).
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interest also tend to allow such transactions where the transactions are fair
to the charitable corporation." 7 However, if a director as "insider" self-
deals for "private inurement," the charity can lose its tax exemption.
218
In the case of a private foundation, the self-dealer as a disqualified person
could incur a fine.2 19 An attorney/director could not afford to be
negligent in this area with regard to the interests of any definable group
with standing.
The charitable corporation director still owes a duty of care to any
group or person with standing.' 0 However, under the Model Act and
many state statutes, this duty is merely to exercise the skill an ordinary
prudent person might possess in managing the affairs of the company, a
considerably lower standard than that owed by trustees.22' This situation,
however, raises interesting questions when the directors are also attorneys.
Suppose first of all that the director is a lawyer, but the director and
the rest of the board are being advised by independent counsel. A question
certainly arises here of whether the attorney, because of the attorney's
professional expertise, owes a higher duty than the typical director. Now,
suppose this attorney/director is also a member of the law firm advising
the charitable corporation. If the board as a whole owes only a duty of
simple prudence, can it be said that this lawyer and this lawyer's firm owe
a higher duty to beneficially interested plaintiffs than is due them by the
board itself? Conceptually, this would only make sense if the duty owed
to these beneficiaries was a direct one and not derivative of the firm's
duties to the board. If the lawyer's duties to the beneficiaries were direct,
nursing home occupants and hopefuls such as those in Fuller Trust might
argue as follows if the charitable entity there were a corporation: that
while the law firm may have only had to advise the board to manage with
simple prudence, because of their professional expertise the firm's lawyers
owed a separate, higher duty to foreseeable plaintiffs such as these
beneficiaries.
217. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 452-54.
218. HOPKINS, supra note 172, at 264-99.
219. Id. at 453.
220. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 15, at 453-54.
221. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text (discussing the fiduciary standards of trustees and
directors in charitable organizations). But see generally Buding & Allen, supra note 16 (stating that the standard
is between a corporate and a trustee standard).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Lawyers representing a charitable trust or corporation generally should
not serve as trustees or directors of that organization. Though their risks
of liability are less in the charitable than in the for-profit arena, these
attorneys may be required by state attorneys general to return monies to
the charitable entity which were obtained by abuse of the duties of care or
loyalty.
Currently, however, the chance of such enforcement action is
considerably less than 100%, so if risks to a personal reputation are
ignored, it will always "pay" for the dishonest fiduciaries to abuse their
position. At worst, they will have to return to the trust 100% of the monies
dishonestly obtained. Any Internal Revenue Service action will be limited
to loss of the entity's tax exempt status or, rarely, in the case of a "private
foundation," will involve a fine for the director involved.
Still there is movement toward a more effective enforcement policy
which should concern attorneys. "Specially interested beneficiaries" have
been allowed to sue for breach of fiduciary duty and this could be
expanded to suits for malpractice against the attorney in a professional
role.222 Failing increased court support for such suits, overworked
attorneys general could still refer lawyer fiduciary abuses to state lawyer
licensing boards for professional disciplinary procedures.
Finally, some commentators have suggested statutory fines equal to
more than 100% of the money dishonestly taken, or penal damages against
charitable fiduciaries in private actions.22' In any event, lawyers serving
as charitable fiduciaries face an increased risk of meaningful regulation
amidst an atmosphere of heightened general concern over abuses of "trust"
by both fiduciaries and legal professionals.
222. See supra notes 196-221 and accompanying text (describing how malpractice suits may be brought
against attorneys when the attorneys have breached a fiduciary duty).
223. See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text (recommending a system of fines that would
reimburse charities in an amount equal to three times the fiduciary's improperly-gained profits).
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